Abstract. Adaptively secure multiparty computation is an essential and fundamental notion in cryptography. In this work we focus on the basic question of constructing a multiparty computation protocol secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary in the stand-alone setting without assuming an honest majority, in the plain model. It has been believed that this question can be resolved by composing known protocols from the literature. We show that in fact, this belief is fundamentally mistaken. In particular, we show: -Round inefficiency is unavoidable when using black-box simulation: There does not exist any o( n log n ) round protocol that adaptively securely realizes a (natural) n-party functionality with a black-box simulator. Note that most previously known protocols in the adaptive security setting relied on black-box simulators.
Our Techniques
The central idea for our impossibility result is to argue that a black-box simulator of an o( n log n ) round protocol for an n-party functionality does not gain anything via "rewindings" in the adaptive setting. Now we elaborate on this. Consider an r round (such that r is o( n log n )) protocol for an n-party functionality with a black-box simulator. Consider an adversary that behaves completely honestly in the protocol itself, however, after each round of the protocol it corrupts roughly ω(log n) parties. Furthermore, the parties to be corrupted are chosen randomly (in fact pseudo-randomly based on the protocol messages so far) among the uncorrupted parties so far. On corruption of an honest party, the simulator is obliged to provide to the adversary the input of the party just corrupted. In its "main thread" execution with the adversary, to help the simulator in simulation, the simulator is also provided with these inputs. However, every time the simulator "rewinds" the adversary, the adversary will (with overwhelming probability) choose to corrupt at least one party that is not among the ones corrupted in the main thread. The simulator therefore will be unable to proceed in any "rewinding." Note that the only additional power awarded to a black-box simulator is essentially the ability to "rewind" the adversary which is essentially useless in our context. We therefore conclude that no such simulator can exist.
As is clear from the impossibility result just described, the problem of round inefficiency will be inherent to any simulator that "rewinds." In order to get around this problem, we turn to the non black-box simulation technique of Barak [Bar01] . However, Barak's protocols are far from being adaptively secure. To achieve adaptive security, we adapt and make use of a technique developed in the context of concurrently secure computation [PR03, PR08, BS05] .
Technical overview for the construction of our constant round protocol: Now we give a detailed technical overview of our construction. We will start by giving a high level idea of the final protocol and then delving into the details of sub-protocol (along with specifics of constructions) that need to be built. Throughout the following description, we advise the reader to keep in mind that our goal is to construct a round efficient protocol and as is clear from the negative result stated above this cannot be done with a simulator that "rewinds." Therefore we will restrict ourselves to a "straight-line" or a "non-rewinding" simulator.
-Reducing the problem of adaptively secure MPC to generation of common random strings.
The starting point of our construction is the observation that an adaptively secure MPC protocol (Theorem 3, [IPS08] ) 4 for any functionality can be realized in OT-hybrid (oblivious transfer) model. Note that in this construction each OT call is made between two parties. Further note that for an OT call between two parties security is required only if at least one of the two parties is honest. Additionally, note that we can adaptively securely realize OT functionality in the CRS hybrid (common random string) model (e.g., using [CLOS02] ). Therefore in order to construct an adaptively secure protocol it suffices for us to adaptively securely realize the CRS functionality between every pair of parties where the CRS generated by a pair of parties is required to be honestly generated only if at least one of the two parties is honest.
-Generating a common random string between a pair of parties. Now we are left with the goal of adaptively securely realizing CRS between every pair of parties. We start by giving intuition for a protocol that adaptively securely realizes CRS between two parties and then sketch the extension to the setting of multiple parties. We do this by constructing a coin flipping protocol secure in the adaptive setting in which the simulator can simulate in a straight-line manner. In order to construct such a coin flipping protocol our simulator will need the ability to equivocate on its commitments. In other words, we will need that our simulator can open its commitments to any value of its choice even after it has made those commitments. Looking ahead the simulator will also need the ability to extract (the reasons for which we see later) from the commitments made by the adversary. More specifically, we will need that the simulator can extract the values committed to by the adversary. Next we will first describe a mechanism that allows a straight-line simulator to equivocate on its commitments in the except their own share (and the shares they receive from other parties). Finally, they run the protocol on the shares as inputs instead. However, we again stress that we find this solution highly unsatisfactory in light of the discussion above. 4 We refer the reader to Remark 2 of [IPS08] for discussion on variants of this result.
adaptive setting. Subsequently, we will see how equivocation can be used in setting up coin flipping (and the need of extractability in the process).
-Equivocal commitment scheme in the adaptive setting. We consider the public-coin zero-knowledge protocol 5 of Barak [Bar01] . Even though this protocol is secure against adaptive corruptions of the verifier, it is far from being adaptively secure if we were to consider adaptive corruption of the prover. We will modify Barak's protocol as follows. For every bit sent by the prover in the Barak's protocol, we will require that our prover instead sends a random string of appropriate (length of a pseudorandom bit commitment) length. Note that in this modified protocol no actual proof is given. Furthermore, all the messages sent by an honest prover and an honest verifier in this modified protocol are just random bits and thus adaptive corruption of parties participating in an execution of this modified protocol does not help the adversary in any way. However, a key idea is that we can define an NP-relation that accepts a transcript if only if there exist decommitments of the prover messages such the decommitted prover messages along with the verifier messages form an accepting transcript of an execution of the Barak's protocol. Roughly speaking our modified protocol has two properties, with respect to this NP-relation:
• No adaptively corrupted cheating prover interacting with an honest verifier in our modified protocol can output a witness for the transcript generated.
• Consider any execution in which the prover is honest. In this execution our simulator (simulating the prover) can internally use the simulator of Barak's protocol and always output a witness for the transcript generated. We can reduce this transcript to a graph (can be constructed using an NP-reduction) that is Hamiltonian if and only if there exits a witness corresponding to the above NP-relation. Furthermore, given the witness we can also deduce the Hamiltonian cycle in the obtained graph. This graph can now be used to generate commitments such that a party with access to a cycle in the graph can open them in any way. We refer the reader to Section 4 for more details on this. Note that an execution of the modified Barak's protocol guarantees equivocability of commitments sent on behalf of only one of the two parties. Therefore we will have to set up two equivocal commitments. This can be easily achieved by execution modified Barak's protocol twice between the two parties switching the roles the two parties play in the two executions of the modified Barak's protocol.
-Coin flipping protocol secure in the adaptive setting. Next using equivocal commitments, we construct a coin flipping protocol between two parties A and B. One standard approach for constructing such a coin flipping protocol is to have the two-parties commit to random strings (via equivocal commitments) which they subsequently open one by one. The output of the protocol corresponds to the exclusive or of the two strings. Lets consider the case in which A opens first. The key technical problem that arises in this case is that if B is corrupted then the straight-line simulator (simulating A) without knowledge of the value committed to by B will not be able to force the output of the protocol to a value of its choice. We solve this problem by doing two coin flips both of which roughly follow the same outline as above. The first coin flipping is done in-order to setup a public key of a public key encryption scheme (with pseudorandom public-keys and pseudorandom ciphertexts). In this protocol we require that B opens first and this allows the simulator to force the output of the protocol to a value of its choice (in a straight-line manner) as long as A is honest. Subsequently the parties execute a second coin flipping protocol in which we require that B (B opens later now), in addition to the commitment it sends, is required to send encryption of the randomness used in generating the commitment using the public key generated in the first coin flipping. This allows the simulator to extract the value committed by B (if B is corrupted) even before A needs to open its committed value and thereby allowing it to simulate in a straight line manner. However, in case B is honest then the simulator will have to explain the encryptions as if they were honestly generated. We achieve this in a way similar to [CLOS02] . -Setting up multiple common random strings. Additionally other well known issues relating to non-malleability arise in constructing of constant round protocols [KOS03] because of the need to execute different protocol instances in parallel. We deal with issue using the two-slot technique of [PR03] . Concretely we consider Pass' [Pas04] family of non-black-box zero knowledge protocols with strong simulation soundness properties, i.e., any one of these protocols continues to remain sound even when all the other protocols in the family are being simulated. We prove that modifying these protocols just like we modified the Barak's protocol above suffices for our purposes.
Roadmap.
We start by recalling the formal definition of adaptive secure MPC in Section 2. We then provide our impossibility result for protocols with black-box simulation in Section 3. Next we recall some very basic notions and setup notation in Section 4. Finally we provide the construction of our constant round protocol in Section 6 using sub-protocols constructed in Section 5.
Adaptively Secure Multi-Party Computation
In this section we recall the formal definition of adaptively secure MPC. We adapt our definition of adaptive MPC from [CFGN96, Can98] . Parts of the text have been taken verbatim from [CFGN96] . In order to define adaptive MPC we first describe the real world model process; next we describe the ideal process; and finally present the definition.
Real
World. An n-party protocol π is a collection of n interactive, probabilistic algorithms, where the i th algorithm is run by the i th party, P i . Each P i has input x i ∈ {0, 1} * , random input r i ∈ {0, 1} * , and the security parameter k. We assume that all communication is done via a broadcast channel. That is, any message sent by some party at some communication round is received by all other parties (including the adversary) before the beginning of the next round.
At the onset of the computation A receives some auxiliary information z. Next, the computation proceeds according to the given model of computation. For concreteness, we specify the following (synchronous, with rushing) model of computation. The computation proceeds in rounds; each round proceeds in mini-rounds, as follows. Each mini-round starts by allowing A to corrupt parties one by one in an adaptive way. (The behavior of the system upon corruption of a party is described below.) Next A chooses an uncorrupted party, P i , that was not yet activated in this round and activates it. Upon activation, P i receives the messages sent to it in the previous round, generates its messages for this round, and the next mini-round begins. A also learns the messages sent by P i . Once all the uncorrupted parties were activated, A generates the messages to be sent by the corrupted parties that were not yet activated in this round, and the next round begins.
Once a party is corrupted the party's input and random input (note that the adversary already knowns the entire history of the messages sent and received by the party) become known to A.
At the end of the computation (say, at some pre-determined round) all parties locally generate their outputs. The uncorrupted parties output whatever is specified in the protocol. The corrupted parties output any arbitrary PPT function of the view of A.
The overall output of the real-world experiment consists of all the values output by all parties at the end of the protocol, and is denoted by REAL
Ideal World. We first define the ideal world experiment, where n parties P 1 , . . . , P n interact with a trusted party for computing a function f :
* . Note that the parties wish to evaluate f (k,
and s is a value determined by the security parameter and P i learns f (k, x, r f ) i . The ideal world computation in presence of the adaptive ideal world adversary S (with random input r) and an (incorruptible) trusted party, F proceeds as follows.
First corruption stage:
First, as in the real-life model, S gets an auxiliary information z. Next, S proceeds in iterations, where in each iteration S may decide to corrupt some party based on S's random input and the information gathered so far. Once a party is corrupted its input becomes known to S. Let B denote the set of parties corrupted at the end of this stage. Computation stage: Each honest party P i sends its input x i to the trusted party F. For each corrupted party, the adversary may select any value y i (based on the information gathered so far) and send it to the trusted party. Let y 1 , . . . , y n be the inputs that were sent to the trusted party F. Next, F chooses r f randomly from {0, 1} s and hands each party P i the value f (k, y, r f ) i .
Second corruption stage:
Upon learning the corrupted parties' outputs of the computation, S proceeds in another sequence of iterations, where in each iteration S may decide to corrupt some additional party, based on the information gathered so far. Upon corruption, S sees the corrupted party's input and output. Output stage: Each uncorrupted party P i outputs f (k, y, r f ) i , and the corrupted parties output some arbitrary PPT function of the information gathered by the adversary during the computation in the ideal process. Post-execution corruption: Once the outputs are generated, just like in the second corruption phase, S at any point in the protocol may decide to adaptively proceed in another sequence of iterations, where in each iteration S may decide to corrupt some additional party, based on the information gathered so far.
The overall output of the ideal process consists of all the values output by all parties at the end of the protocol, and is denoted by IDEAL 
Round inefficiency with a black-box simulation is unavoidable
In this section, we show the existence of a deterministic n-party functionality for which there does not exist any o( n log n ) round adaptively secure protocol, with a black-box simulator. Before proceeding to the formal proof, we first give some intuition behind our impossibility result. The central idea to our proof is to argue that a black-box simulator (say) S of an o( n log n ) round protocol does not gain any thing via "rewindings" in the adaptive setting. Informally speaking, this means that the simulator fails to get any useful information from any look-ahead thread and even in this setting it must still be able to extract the adversary's input. However, a simulator must have some additional power over a real adversary, and the only additional power awarded to a black-box simulator is essentially the ability to rewind the adversary. We therefore conclude that black-box simulators cannot exist for any o( n log n ) round protocol, as stated in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1.
There exist a deterministic n-party functionality for which there does not (assuming one way functions) exist any o( n log n ) round adaptively secure protocol (as per Definition 1)with respect to black-box simulators.
Proof. We will organize our proof into two main parts.
1. First, we consider the commitment functionality F , where there are two special parties -the committer C and the receiver R, and n − 2 dummy parties. Let Π be any o( n log n )-round n-party protocol that adaptively securely realizes F with respect to a black-box simulator. Then, for large enough n, we first construct an adversary A for Π, that corrupts C, such that every black-box simulator S for Π gets full participation from the adversary in the "main thread," but fails to get any "useful" information from the rewindings. Our adversary A, has the inputs of dummy parties hard-coded inside itself and it acts in the following way. It starts by corrupting the committer C. It follows the honest committer strategy on behalf of C, except that after each round of Π it corrupts roughly ω(log n) parties. Furthermore, the parties to be corrupted are chosen randomly (in fact pseudo-randomly based on the protocol messages so far) among the uncorrupted parties so far. On corruption of an honest party, the simulator is obliged to provide to the adversary the input of the party just corrupted. In its "main thread" execution with the adversary, to help the simulator in simulation, the simulator is also provided with these inputs. However, every time the simulator "rewinds" the adversary, the adversary will (with overwhelming probability) choose to corrupt at least one party that is not among the ones corrupted in the main thread. The simulator therefore will be unable to proceed in any "rewinding." However, by security of the protocol such a simulator must still be able to extract the input of C. Proving this is in fact the crux of our proof. 2. Next, we consider another real-life adversary A ′ , that corrupts all parties except C, uses the black-box simulator S (constructed above) and actually succeeds in extracting the input of the honest committer. This contradicts the assumption that Π securely realizes F .
Combining the two parts, we conclude that for the n-party commitment functionality F (as described above), there does not exist any o( n log n )-round protocol that adaptively securely realizes F with respect to black-box simulators. We note that this is sufficient to prove Theorem 1. We give more details on both parts of the proof next.
PART 1. Simulator failing in all rewindings
Let F be an n-party commitment functionality with two special parties -the committer C with input x C , the receiver R, and n − 2 dummy parties with inputs x 1 , x 2 . . . x n−2 respectively, each of which is a k-bit long uniform random string. In this setting we start by making the notion of a round precise. In the n-party setting a round involves a messages being sent by every party. We will think of a round as a two step process. In the first step all the honest parties (the ones that are supposed to according to the protocol) send their messages and in the second step the adversary sends the messages on behalf of all the corrupted parties (again for the ones that are supposed to according to the protocol). Description of A. We will first construct an adversary A, that has the inputs x 1 , x 2 . . . x n−2 hard-coded inside itself. In other words the adversary is aware of the values x 1 , x 2 . . . x n−2 and it will use them in its execution. A acts in the following way. It starts by corrupting the committer C. Furthermore, it follows the honest committer strategy on behalf of C, except that for each round of Π (which has r = o( n log n ) rounds) after the messages sent on behalf of all honest parties have been received, A corrupts µ(k) = n 2r parties chosen randomly (in fact, pseudorandom in the transcript so far) among the uncorrupted dummy parties. At this point the simulator provides the inputs (and the randomness) of the corrupted dummy parties to adversary. Our adversary ignores the randomness, matches the provided input values against the values hard-coded inside it. It aborts with a special abort message Match-Abort if any of the values does not match. Finally, it responds with appropriate messages on behalf of all honest parties.
Next we argue that no black-box simulator S, that completes the "main thread," can succeed in preventing the adversary from aborting in the look-ahead threads (except with negligible probability) and therefore fails to get any "useful" information from the rewindings. We first introduce some notations and conventions for the remainder of the proof. We will borrow some of our notations and conventions from [BL04] . Without loss of generality, we assume that R is the protocol initiator in Π. Recall that the number of rounds in Π is r, where one round consists of messages sent by the honest parties and then the adversary. Now, recall that a black-box simulator S for any protocol has 'oracle access' to the real world adversary A. Formally, we consider A as a non-interactive algorithm that gets as input the history of the messages sent to A, and outputs the next message that A would send in an execution of Π corresponding to the specific execution. More formally, S can query A with any sequence of messages of the form (
e., the query contains the history of the messages sent to the adversary), and it will receive back the next message that A would send in any execution of Π in which it received this sequence of messages. Note that this history consists of two kinds of messages. The α i s correspond to the messages of the protocol Π. On the other hand β i s corresponds to the inputs (along with the random coins) of the honest parties that the simulator sends in response to the adversary's corruption requests. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume without loss of generality, that the simulator S always follows the following two conventions:
We note that it is easy to modify any black-box simulator such that it follows the above conventions, without affecting its output distribution.
Note that our adversary never aborts with Match-Abort in the real world. This is because in the real world an honest party on corruption always responds with its true input which will match with the inputs hard-coded inside the adversary. Therefore, by indistinguishability of the outputs generated by the adversary and the simulator, the adversary must not abort (in the "main thread") in its interaction with the simulator. Therefore S needs to make at least r queries of the form (α 1 , β 1 , α 2 , β 2 . . . , α i , β i ) for each i ∈ [r] in order to be able to just complete the "main thread." Therefore, the simulator S makes exactly one query of the form (α 1 , β 1 , α 2 , β 2 . . . , α i , β i ) for each i ∈ [r] and in order to avoid Match-Abort in any of these executions (and maintain indistinguishability of the outputs generated by the adversary and the simulator) it must corrupt the same parties as A. Note that in the "main thread" of the execution the adversary corrupts a total of up to rµ(k) (i.e., n 2 ) parties and our simulator is allowed to corrupt only the same parties. This in particular implies that our simulator cannot corrupt more that n 2 parties. Let E be the event that a simulator successfully makes any additional query of the form (
to the adversary such that the adversary does not output Match-Abort. We will next argue that E happens with negligible probability allowing us to conclude that S fails every time it rewinds A.
For the sake of contradiction we start by assuming there exists a simulator such that E happens with a non-negligible probability. Now observe that within this query β i corresponds to the inputs of n r (i.e., ω(log n)) parties which are chosen pseudo-randomly in α 1 , β 1 , α 2 , β 2 . . . , α i . We start by changing the experiment slightly. Instead of choosing the parties to be corrupted pseudo-randomly we choose these parties randomly. It follows from that security of the pseudorandom function that E still happens with a non-negligible probability. The probability, in this experiment, that all the freshly chosen ω(log n) parties come from the n 2 parties that the simulator corrupts (for simulation of the "main-thread") is less that
, which is negligible. Additionally, recall that inputs of dummy parties were chosen randomly and the simulator can correctly guess these values only with a negligible probability. This is a contradiction.
PART 2. Adversary A
′ against which F is insecure We already have a simulator S that does not rewind the adversary A (described above) and still successfully extracts the input x C of the committer. Next we will construct another adversary A ′ that corrupts R and all the dummy parties, executes S internally and successfully extracts the input x C of the committer. A ′ internally executes S and follows the same strategy as A, except that all messages it sends on behalf of C (i.e., the α i s) are actually obtained from an external honest committer C. S must still continue to extract the input of the committer C. Since the simulator never rewinds A, we will never need to rewind the external party C. This contradicts the security of the protocol Π and concludes the proof.
Building Blocks for our Constant Round Protocol
In this section we recall and define some very basic notions and setup notation. Let k denote a security parameter. We say that a function is negligible in the security parameter k if it is asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any fixed polynomial. Otherwise, the function is said to be non-negligible in k. We say that an event happens with overwhelming probability if it happens with a probability p(k) = 1 − ν(k) where ν(k) is a negligible function of k. In this section, we recall the definitions of basic primitives studied in this paper. We now discuss the main cryptographic primitives that we use in our construction.
Underlying standard commitment. The basic underlying commitment scheme Com is the standard noninteractive commitment scheme based on a one-way permutation f and a hard-core predicate b of f . That is, in order to commit to a bit σ, one computes
k . Note that Com is computationally secret, and produces pseudorandom commitments: that is, the distributions Com(0), Com(1), and U k+1 are computationally indistinguishable. Let the length of the commitment, for one bit message, generated by the pseudorandom commitment scheme be ℓ C (k) (k + 1 in the above case). For simplicity of exposition, in the sequel, unless necessary, we will assume that random coins are an implicit input to the commitment function. Furthermore, we will sometimes abuse notation and use the same notation to generate commitments to strings, which can be thought of as a concatenation of commitments of individual bits.
The Feige-Shamir Commitment Scheme. We briefly define the Feige-Shamir trapdoor commitment scheme [FS89] , which is based on the the zero-knowledge proof of Hamiltonicity of Blum [Blu87] . Some of the text has been taken verbatim from there [BS05] . First, fix a graph G (with q nodes) with a Hamiltonian cycle (We specify the graph to be used later). Then, in order to commit to 0, the committer commits to a random permutation of G using the underlying commitment scheme Com (and decommits by revealing the entire graph and the permutation). In order to commit to 1, the committer commits to a graph containing a randomly labeled q-cycle only (and decommits by opening the cycle only). Note that the ability to decommit to 0 and 1 implies that the committer knows a Hamiltonian cycle in G. On the other hand, given a Hamiltonian cycle in G, it is possible to generate commitments that are indistinguishable from legal ones, and yet have the property that one can decommit to both a 0 and a 1. Note that if the graph G is not hamiltonian, then this commitment scheme is a perfectly-binding computationally-hiding scheme. The modifier graph based commitment scheme IDCom G . We use the notation of [BS05] and some of the text has been taken verbatim from there [BS05] . Our graph-based scheme, introduced in [CLOS02] , which we denote IDCom G , differs from the [FS89] scheme above in the following way:
To commit to a 0, the sender picks a random permutation π of the nodes of G, and commits to the entries of the adjacency matrix of the permuted graph one by one, using Com. The sender also commits (using Com) to the permutation π. These values are sent to the receiver as c = IDCom G (0). To decommit, the sender decommits to π and decommits to every entry of the adjacency matrix. The receiver verifies that the graph it received is π(G).
To commit to a 1, the sender chooses a randomly labeled q-cycle, and for all the entries in the adjacency matrix corresponding to edges on the q-cycle, it uses Com to commit to 1 values. For all the other entries, including the commitment to the permutation π, it simply produces random values from U k+1 (for which it does not know the decommitment!). These values are sent to the received as c = IDCom G (1). To decommit, the sender opens only the entries corresponding to the randomly chosen q-cycle in the adjacency matrix.
This commitment scheme has the property of being computationally secret, i.e. the distributions IDCom G (0) and IDCom G (1) are computationally indistinguishable for any graph G. Also, given the opening of any commitment to both a 0 and 1, one can extract a Hamiltonian cycle in G. Finally, as with the scheme of [FS89] , given a Hamiltonian cycle in G, one can generate commitments to 0 and then open those commitments to both 0 and 1.
Furthermore, here if the simulator has knowledge of a Hamiltonion cycle in G, it can also produce a random tape for the sender explaining c = IDCom G (0) as a commitment to both 0 and 1. If, upon corruption of the sender, the simulator has to demonstrate that c is a commitment to 0 then all randomness is revealed. To demonstrate that c was generated as a commitment to 1, the simulator opens the commitments to the edges in the q-cycle and claims that all the unopened commitments are merely uniformly chosen strings (rather than commitments to the rest of G). This can be done since commitments produced by the underlying commitment scheme Com are pseudorandom.
In this setting as well, we will sometimes abuse notation and use the same notation to generate commitments to strings. In particular, we will use the notation c = IDCom G (m; r) to denote the function that generates a commitment to m using random coins r. Furthermore a commitment c = IDCom G (0 κ ; r ′ ) to the zero string of length κ can be explained to any value m using the function r = IDOpen G (m, r ′ , w), where w is a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph G. Dense cryptosystems. In our construction we will need an the encryption scheme that has pseudo-random public keys. More specifically, we require that the public key is indistinguishable from a random string. Such an encryption scheme can be constructed from dense cryptosystems [DSP92] . Furthermore, we will require that the scheme has pseudorandom ciphertexts. More formally:
Definition 2 (Encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts). A public-key cryptosystem (G, E, D) has pseudorandom ciphertexts of length ℓ E (k) if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have
where R pk (m) runs c ← {0, 1} ℓE (k) and every time returns a fresh c. We require that the cryptosystem has errorless decryption.
Barak's Non-Black Box technique.
We use the non black-box simulation technique of Pass [Pas04] (which in turn builds on the work of Barak [Bar01] ). Consider a "special" NTIME(T (k)) relation R Sim as follows.
7 Let k ∈ N and let T : N → N be a "nice" function that satisfies 
Witness Indistinguishable Universal Argument. The function T (k) corresponding to the above describe relation R Sim is super-polynomial in k. This implies that the language corresponding to R Sim does not lie in NP (but rather in NTIME(T (k))). Such languages are beyond the scope of the "standard" witness indistinguishable proof systems (designed to handle NP-languages only), and will thus require the usage of a Witness Indistinguishable Universal Argument (WI-UARG) [BG08] . We note that the WI-UARG protocol of Barak and Goldreich [BG08] is public coin and the running time of the verifier in the protocol is bounded by a fixed polynomial.
Sub-Protocols Used in our Constant Round Protocol
In the construction of our final adaptively secure MPC protocol will use a concurrently secure trapdoor generator protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ and a coin flipping protocol ⟨A, B⟩. In this section we will give a constructions of these protocols. Furthermore, we will prove special properties about these protocols that are useful for us in our final construction.
Trapdoor Generator Protocol
In this section we describe a family of trapdoor generator protocols ⟨P, V ⟩ i where i ∈ {1 . . . m}. ⟨P, V ⟩ i is a two party protocol between P i and V i and at the end of the protocol both parties output a Graph (let's say G). Consider the setting in which one protocol instance of each of the protocols ⟨P, V ⟩ 1 , ⟨P, V ⟩ 2 . . . ⟨P, V ⟩ m is being executed concurrently in between n parties -Q 1 , . . . Q n with inputs x 1 . . . x n .
8 We stress that in these protocol executions each Q i could potentially be playing the role of multiple P j 's and V k 's where j, k ∈ {1 . . . m}. In this setting we consider an adversary A that adaptively corrupts parties (an honest party reveals its input and random coins to the adversary on corruption).
However, for simplicity of exposition, we will model this instead as a setting of n+2m parties -Q 1 , . . . Q n with inputs x 1 . . . x n and P 1 , . . . P m , V 1 , . . . V m with no inputs. Furthermore, parties P i and V i execute an instance of the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i . In this setting, we will consider an adversary that adaptively corrupts any of these parties.We stress that any adversary in the original setting where each Q i could potentially be playing the role of multiple P j 's and V k 's can always be used to construct an adversary in this setting. This follows from the fact that in the original setting when an adversary corrupts a party Q i it additionally corrupts multiple P j 's and V k 's. Analogously in this setting our adversary can continue to corrupt all the parties playing the roles of Q i and P j 's and V k 's. Throughout the rest of this sub-section we will stick to this setting. Very informally, assuming collision resistant hash functions, we will require that our protocol satisfies the following security properties:
1. For every such adversary A that adaptively corrupts parties, there exists a non-black box simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ (that obtains the inputs of parties adaptively corrupted by A) such that the view of the adversary A in its interaction with honest parties and the view of the adversary A in its interaction with S ⟨P,V ⟩ are computationally indistinguishable.
7 The relation presented is slightly oversimplified and will make Barak's protocol work only when the hash function family is collision resistant against "slightly" super-polynomial sized circuits [Bar01] . However, this can be modified to work assuming collision resistance against polynomial sized circuits only. It does not affect the analysis in this paper and we refer the reader to [BG08] for details. 8 As we will see later that we only need security in the setting of parallel composition. However, in this section we will stick with the notion of concurrent composition and argue security in this setting. From this it follows immediately that our protocol is also secure in the less demanding setting of parallel composition. such that P i is not corrupted it is additionally provided with the Hamiltonian cycle in the graph that the execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i yields. 4. Finally, since we are in the adaptive setting, on corruption, an honest party (or, the simulator on behalf of the honest party in the simulated setting) must provide its input and random coins to the adversary. We will require that all the above properties hold even when this additional communication happens with the adversary.
For every i ∈
Next we build some notation that will be useful in the formal description of our protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i (in Figure 1 ).
Com is a pseudo-random commitment scheme with output from {0, 1} ℓ C (k) . a We also use the "shadow version" of the 5-round public-coin WI-UARG protocol which we denote by sWI-UARG.
1. Pi sends a random string in c1
2. Vi sends a challenge string r1
Slot 2 : 1. Pi sends a random string in c2
2. Vi sends a challenge string r2 a We use commitments based on one-way permutation just for simplicity of exposition. At the cost of a small complication, the one-message scheme could have been replaced by the Naor's [Nao91] 2-message commitment scheme, which can be based on "ordinary" one-way functions. b As already pointed, we advise the reader to keep in mind that both the honest prover and the honest verifier of the shadow version of the WI-UARG protocol just send random bits and that no real proof in an honest execution is ever given. 
Main Proof Stage

Shadow version of WI-UARG.
Recall that in the WI-UARG protocol V only sends random bits. Finally at the end of the protocol V outputs 1 or 0. We will modify the WI-UARG protocol into what we call the shadow version of the WI-UARG protocol. The prover in the shadow protocol, for every bit sent by the prover in the original protocol, sends a random string in {0, 1} ℓ C (k) (recall that ℓ C (k) is the length of a pseudorandom commitment). Furthermore, the behavior of the verifier V remains unmodified. We will denote this modified protocol by sWI-UARG. Consider an instance of execution of the sWI-UARG protocol with transcript transcript. Note that this transcript contains messages sent by the prover and the messages sent by the verifier. Further note that every ℓ C (k) bit string sent by the prover could be interpreted (if they really are) as a commitment to a bit using the commitment scheme Com. Let w be the de-commitment information (if it exists) corresponding to all the ℓ C (k) bit strings in transcript that are sent by the prover. Also let transcript ′ = unshadow(transcript, w) 9 denote the transcript obtained by replacing 9 Note that the function unshadow is inefficient and is used just to define the NP-Relation.
every ℓ C (k) bit string in transcript that is sent by P with the corresponding committed bit (as per Com). Let R uarg (transcript, w) = 1 if and only if V (unshadow(transcript, w)) = 1. We stress that in the shadow version of the WI-UARG protocol both the honest prover and the honest verifier just send random strings and that no real proof is actually given. However, we also consider a modification of the prover strategy of shadow version of the WI-UARG protocol called the simulated shadow prover. The simulated shadow prover additionally obtains a witness for the statement being proven and corresponding to every bit sent by the prover in the original WI-UARG protocol instead sends a commitment to that bit using the Com commitment scheme. Note that transcript transcript generated when the prover follows the simulated shadow prover strategy is such that there exists w such that R uarg (transcript, w) = 1. Finally, note that the messages generated by a simulated shadow prover are computationally indistinguishable from the messages generated by an honest prover of the shadow version of the WI-UARG protocol. We will use this shadow prover strategy in our proof. Common Parameters. All parties receive two parameters m(k) and ℓ(k) as input. m(k) corresponds to the size of the family of ⟨P, V ⟩ protocols. In the adaptive setting, on corruption a party reveals its input to the adversary. We need a bound of this additional information sent to the adversary. This bound ℓ(k) corresponds to the sum of the lengths of inputs of parties Q 1 , . . . , Q n . Discussion about the protocol. Observe that the entire protocol as described in Figure 1 involves only random strings from honest P i and honest V i . Also note that the main proof stage involves an execution of the shadow version of the WI-UARG protocol. As already pointed out an honest execution of this protocol does not involve any actual proof being given. Therefore, the graph generated in an honest execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i will essentially never be Hamiltonian. We provide full details on our simulator for the family of ⟨P, V ⟩ protocols and the proofs of the security properties next.
Our simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ .
Recall that we are in the setting of n + 2m parties -Q 1 , . . . Q n with inputs x 1 . . . x n and P 1 , . . . P m , V 1 , . . . V m with no inputs. Furthermore, P i and V i execute the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i . In this setting we consider an adversary A that adaptively corrupts parties of its choice. Note that whenever an honest party is corrupted it is required to reveal its input and random coins to the adversary. In our setting we have two kind of parties-1. Q 1 , . . . Q n : These parties have inputs but do not send any other messages. The sum of the lengths of the inputs of these parties is bounded by ℓ(k).
These parties do not have any inputs. Furthermore, all the messages sent by these parties are just random coins, and therefore, the protocol transcript, at any point, reveals all the random coins of all these parties used thus far. Therefore without loss of generality, we assume that the corruption of these parties does not reveal anything to the adversary.
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We will now describe our simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ . We will describe the simulation strategy for each P i and V i separately. Our simulator maintains a list, challenge seeds, of seeds of a pseudorandom generator. It also maintains a special output tape, special outputs, on which it outputs Hamiltonian cycles in the graphs that different executions of ⟨P, V ⟩ generate.
Simulating corruption requests. Whenever the adversary A sends a request to corrupt a party Q i for some i ∈ [n], then our simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ obtains Q i 's input x i and sends it to the adversary. Note that Q i does not send any messages and there is nothing else to handle. On the other hand we next consider the case in which the adversary A sends a request to corrupt a party P i or a party V i for some i ∈ [m]. As already pointed out, note that the protocol transcript reveals the random coins of P i and V i used so far. Furthermore these parties do not have any inputs. Therefore without loss of generality we can assume that on corruption these parties need not reveal anything to the adversary. However the adversary, from now on, gets full control of the corrupted party. More specifically, all future messages on behalf of the corrupted party are sent by A.
Simulating V i . Internally run the honest verifier strategy, for the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i , but instead of sending a truly random strings as challenges (in Slot 1 and 2 of the protocol), pick a k bit long random string, write it to the special tape challenge seeds, expand it to the appropriate length of the challenge (r 1 or r 2 ) through a pseudorandom generator g and send the expanded string as the challenge. expects the same input except that instead of the challenge strings it expects a succinct description for these messages (i.e., a k bit string that can be expanded to the challenge string using a pseudorandom generator). where τ consists of all the messages S ⟨P,V ⟩ sends to A before the adversary A (controlling party V i ) sends r 1 except the challenge strings that the simulator might have sent on behalf of any other honest V j where j ∈ [m] and j ̸ = i. Corresponding to each of these challenge strings τ consists of a k bit string instead, that can be appropriately expanded to the challenge string (of appropriate length using the pseudorandom generator g). Excluding the challenges r 1 and r 2 , we note that the length of the P i messages and the V i messages in any ⟨P, V ⟩ i can be bounded by 2k 3 if we use the specific WI-UARG of Barak and Goldreich [BG08] . Recall that we execute at most one instance of the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i for each i ∈ [m]. Also note that adaptive corruptions of Q 1 , . . . , Q n might require that an additional ℓ(k) bits be sent to the adversary. Then, the total length of messages sent by S ⟨P,V ⟩ , not including the challenges r 1 and r 2 , is bounded by (m(k) · 2k 3 + ℓ(k)). The challenges r 1 , r 2 are long, but since they are constructed using a pseudorandom generator (with seed written on challenge seeds), they have a description that is bounded by k. Since the number of executions of ⟨P, V ⟩ is bounded by m(k) and since each execution contains only 2 challenges, it follows that the total length of the description in all cases is bounded by µ(k) − k. 5. Let transcript i be the transcript generated in the above execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i . If P i is honest till the end of this execution then S ⟨P,V ⟩ knows the opening of all commitments that are ever sent on behalf of P i . Let w i be the de-commitment information corresponding to all the ℓ C (k) bit strings in transcript i that are sent by the prover. Also let transcript ′ i = unshadow(transcript i , w i ) denote the transcript obtained by replacing every ℓ C (k) bit string in transcript i that is sent by P with the corresponding committed bit (as per Com). Furthermore, from the completeness of the WI-UARG protocol it follows that the simulated shadow prover always succeeds in making the verifier accept. Therefore transcript ′ i is such that V (transcript ′ i , w i ) = 1. This allows us to conclude that R uarg (transcript i , w i ) = 1. Additionally, simulator can use w i to obtain a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph (using the NP-reduction used to generate the graph itself) generated in this execution and outputs it on the special outputs tape.
Security of the ⟨P, V ⟩ protocol
In this section we will argue some security properties about the simulator just constructed. Consider a setting of n + 2m parties -Q Proof. We show the first claim on indistinguishability of the outputs by a sequence of hybrid experiments.
Lemma 1.
-H 0 : This hybrid corresponds to the setting of honest parties interacting with the adversary A.
-H 1 : Same as the previous hybrid, except that we start simulating all honest V i s as specified in the description of the simulator. More specifically, for an honest V i in an execution of the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i , we internally follow the honest V i strategy, but instead of sending truly random strings as challenges (in Slot 1 and 2 of the protocol), we pick a k bit long random string, write it to the special tape challenge seeds, expand it to the appropriate length of the challenge (r 1 or r 2 ) through a pseudorandom generator g and send the expanded string as the challenge. The only difference between hybrids H 1 and H 0 is in the use pseudorandom strings instead of truly random strings. Therefore the outputs of the two hybrids are computationally indistinguishable. -H 2 : Same as the previous hybrid, except that we start simulating honest P i s as specified in the description of the simulator. Recall than an honest P i just sends random strings in {0, 1} ℓC (k) . However, in the simulated setting instead of sending random strings, the simulator instead sends commitments using a pseudorandom commitment scheme. Again the only difference between hybrid H 2 and H 1 is in the use of pseudorandom commitment strings instead of random strings. Therefore the outputs of the two hybrids are computationally indistinguishable.
Observe that the hybrid H 2 corresponds to the actual strategy of the simulator. This proves that the outputs of A in its interaction with honest parties and view of A in its interaction with S ⟨P,V ⟩ are computationally indistinguishable.
Observe that for all executions ⟨P, V ⟩ i for i ∈ [m] for which P i has not been corrupted the simulator obtains a valid witness to execute the simulated shadow version of the WI-UARG. Therefore unless P i is corrupted our simulation can always make V i accept in the execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i . This follows from the completeness of the WI-UARG protocol. Finally, the decommitment information corresponding to the commitments sent by S ⟨P,V ⟩ (on behalf of P i , if it remains honest till the end of the execution) can be used to deduce a Hamiltonian cycle (as explained in the description of the simulator) in the graph the execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i outputs. Proof. We start by observing that the adversary's ability to corrupt parties adaptively does not help it in violating special soundness in any way. More specifically, we argue that if there exists an adaptive adversary A that violates special soundness then there exists a special adversary A ′ that also violates special soundness. The special adversary, however, does not corrupt parties adaptively. Furthermore, a special adversary does not corrupt any P j for j ∈ [m] such that j ̸ = i. Additionally before the start of the interaction it corrupts V j for all j ∈ [m] such that j ̸ = i and corrupts Q j for all j ∈ [n].
Lemma 2. Consider a setting of n
Next, we provide this transformation. Our adversary A ′ starts by corrupting P i , V j for all j ∈ [m] such that j ̸ = i and Q j for all j ∈ [n]. A ′ also obtains the inputs x 1 , . . . , x n after it corrupts parties Q j for all j ∈ [n]. Let T ′ be the set of these corrupted parties. Our adversary A ′ internally simulates A. Also let, T at any point be the set of parties corrupted by A. We first describe how our adversary A ′ handles corruption requests of A. If A requests to corrupt Q j then provide x j to A. On the other hand if A corrupts any other party (i.e., V j for some j ∈ [m] such that j ̸ = i or P j for some j ∈ [n]) then that party is added to T . Every message sent on behalf of T by A such that T ∈ T ′ is forwarded by A ′ to the simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ . On the other hand if S ⟨P,V ⟩ expects a message from a party T ∈ T ′ such that T ̸ ∈ T , then T corresponds to a party V j for j ̸ = i that A has not corrupted and A ′ needs to send a message on V j 's behalf. In this case A ′ generates the next message for V j using the honest V j strategy and sends it both to honest P j and the adversary A. On the other hand, any message sent on behalf of T by the simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ such that T ̸ ∈ T is forwarded by A ′ to A. Any other message sent on behalf of T by the simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ will be such that T corresponds to some party P j where j ̸ = i that A has internally chosen to corrupt. Our adversary A ′ just ignores this message. Finally we deal with the case in which A expects a message from a party T ∈ T ′ such that T ̸ ∈ T . In this case T can corresponds to P i 11 and A ′ needs to send a message on behalf of P i . A ′ chooses this message according to the honest P i strategy and sends it on behalf of P i . After the end of the interaction, for every j ∈ [m] such that j ̸ = i, S ⟨P,V ⟩ provides A ′ with a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph that P j and V j output in the execution ⟨P, V ⟩ j . For every P j such that P j ̸ ∈ T , A ′ forwards the Hamiltonian cycle in the graph that P j and V j output in the execution ⟨P, V ⟩ j to the adversary A. Finally, A ′ outputs the output of A as its output. Now that we have sketched our transformation, we need to argue that if A succeeds in violating special soundness then so does A ′ . Observe that the view of the adversary A in direct interaction with S ⟨P,V ⟩ and the view of the adversary A in interaction with A ′ (that subsequently interacts with S ⟨P,V ⟩ ) is the same except with respect to the messages sent on behalf of P i , before it is corrupted and with respect to the messages sent on behalf of uncorrupted V j s. In the direct interaction between adversary A and S ⟨P,V ⟩ all these aforementioned messages correspond to pseudorandom strings. On the other hand, A ′ sends random strings instead. Therefore, the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable. Now, we are left to show that no special adversary A ′ can violate special soundness. We will argue this in two steps.
1. We say that an adversary P * violates stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i if P * can interact with an honest V i and also output (with non-negligible probability) a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph that the execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i yields. We first start by pointing out that no PPT adversary can violate stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i . We show that if any adversary P * can violate stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i then we can contradict the stand-alone soundness of the zero knowledge protocol of Pass. 2. Next we show that any special adversary A ′ that violates special soundness can be reduced to an adversary that violates stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i , thereby reaching a contradiction.
We first start by pointing out that the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i is stand-alone sound. Pass constructs a family of zero-knowledge protocols {cZK 1 , . . . cZK m } such that each of them is stand-alone sound. Our protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i is the same as that of Pass, except one difference. The main proof stage of our protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i consists of the shadow version of the WI-UARG protocol, while cZK i just consists of the (normal) WI-UARG protocol. In other words, the main proof stage of our protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i involves sending commitments of the messages (during the main proof stage) that would be sent in the cZK i . Additionally, there is no common input that parties get in ⟨P, V ⟩ i while in cZK i the prover and the verifier expect to receive a theorem statement that the prover eventually proves to the verifier. Note that we consider executions of cZK i where the prover is proving a theorem statement that is vacuously false. In other words the theorem statement does not have any witnesses. In further discussion we restrict ourselves to only such protocols cZK i and off course soundness holds against any cheating prover of this protocol.
Lets consider an adversary P * that violates stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i . More specifically, consider an adversary P * that interacts with an honest V i and outputs a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph that this execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i yields with probability p 0 . We will use this P * to construct an adversarial prover P * * , that internally simulates P * and violates the stand-alone soundness of the zero knowledge protocol cZK i . More specifically, P * * succeeds in making an honest verifier V of cZK i accept a false theorem statement. Before the main proof stage, P * * just relays the messages between the internally simulated P * and V. However, for the messages of the main proof stage, P * only provides commitments of the messages that V expects. Therefore we will have to extract the messages from the commitments that P * sends. We start by building some notation. Let c i denote the commitment of message m i that P * sends in round i of the main proof stage. In response to this message P * expects to receive a value r i . Note that i varies from 1 to t, where t is the number of rounds in the main proof stage. Note that t is constant. Furthermore, all the responses r 1 , . . . r t consist of just random strings as the main proof stage only consists of a public coin WI-UARG protocol. Now we will describe how P * * proceeds in the main proof stage. For every i ∈ [t], P * * proceeds as follows:
1. After P * * obtains c i from P * , it halts the "main thread" and starts a look-ahead thread with P * sending freshly chosen random values r i i , . . . r i t to it. (Recall that the protocol is public coin and we can proceed in this manner.) If P * completes this execution and outputs a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph generated, then P * * can use the cycle to extract m i from c i (the cycle in the graph corresponds to the decommitment information for the commitments sent in the execution). If P * aborts at any point in the look ahead thread then P * * also aborts. 2. P * * sends the extracted value m i to V to which V responds with r i . P * * forwards the received value r i to P * in the "main thread."
We now need to argue that P * * violates the stand-alone soundness of the zero knowledge protocol cZK i with a non-negligible probability. Let p i be the conditional probability (over the random choices of r i , . . . r t ) that P * outputs a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph generated in the execution given the transcript of the execution (in the "main thread") so far. By a simple counting argument we claim that for every i the probability p i for i ∈ {1, . . . , t} (over the choices of r i , . . . , r t ) is greater that p i−1 /2 with probability at least p i−1 /2 (over the choices of the prefix of the transcript before message r i ). Therefore the probability p i = p0 2 i . Finally, the probability that P * * succeeds is at least p
t , which is non-negligible given that p 0 is non-negligible. Now we are left to argue that if a special adversary A ′ violates special soundness, then we can use it to construct an adversary A ′′ that violates stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i . This follows in a way very similar to Pass [Pas04] and we just sketch an outline of the proof here. We will argue this in two steps. First we will construct an adversary A ′′ that violates stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i in interaction with a honest V i that obtains its randomness for generating the challenges r 1 and r 2 using a pseudorandom generator. We will denote this modified V i strategy by mV i . Next we can argue that A ′′ violates the stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i in interaction with an honest V i as well. This follows from the security of the pseudo-random generator. Now, we elaborate on the first part of the argument. Observe that, A ′ in its interaction with S ⟨P,V ⟩ (where S ⟨P,V ⟩ generates the messages on behalf of V i ) outputs a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph generated in the execution of ⟨P, V ⟩ i . We now describe our adversary A ′′ whose goal is to violate stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i in interaction with an external honest mV i . A ′′ internally executes S ⟨P,V ⟩ and A ′ . However, S ⟨P,V ⟩ instead of generating messages on behalf of V i on its own will have to externally obtain messages from an external party mV i (playing as V i ). Unfortunately, in this case A ′′ will not be a able to run S ⟨P,V ⟩ because in order to simulate P j for j ̸ = i, S ⟨P,V ⟩ needs a short description of the messages sent on behalf of honest parties, including the ones sent by the external party mV i . In the above scenario, however, since the execution ⟨P, V ⟩ i is externally forwarded to mV i , the simulator does not have a short description of the honest verifier's challenges r 1 , r 2 . To solve this problem we constructor a modified simulator E (modification of S ⟨P,V ⟩ ). We now describe the simulator E that has to simulate messages on behalf of all P j where j ̸ = i. Observe that except for the "long" challenges r 1 , r 2 sent by the external party mV i the simulator has a description of all messages sent to the adversary that is shorter than ℓ(k) − k. However, in order to succeed in the main main proof stage of ⟨P, V ⟩ j for j ̸ = i, even in the presence of "long" messages (to which the simulator does not have a short description), we use the fact that it is sufficient to have a short description of the messages sent in just one of the slots of ⟨P, V ⟩ j . We consider two cases:
-If both the "long" challengers r 1 , r 2 sent by the external party mV i are contained in the same slot (or if they are not contained in any of the two slots), then the simulator can always use the empty slot in order to perform the simulation. -Assume, on the other hand, that r 1 is contained in Slot 1, and r 2 is contained in Slot 2. By construction of the protocols it follows that the length of either the first or the second challenge in P V j is at least µ(k) longer than the corresponding challenge in ⟨P, V ⟩ i (sent by the external party mV i ). Thus there exists a slot in ⟨P, V ⟩ j such that even if we include the external party mV i 's challenge, from the protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ i , in whole, in the description, we still have µ(k) − k to describe the other messages, which means that the simulation can be performed.
Note that the only difference between S ⟨P,V ⟩ and E is the choice of witness used in the main proof stage. While S ⟨P,V ⟩ always picks the first slot, E picks the "appropriate" slot (which can be any of the two). Thus if A ′ , when interacting with S ⟨P,V ⟩ succeeds in outputting a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph generated in ⟨P, V ⟩ i then A ′ when interacting with E, will also succeed in outputting a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph generated in ⟨P, V ⟩ i , or else the witness indistinguishability of the WI-UARG used in ⟨P, V ⟩ i would be broken. From this we conclude that A ′′ breaks the stand-alone soundness of ⟨P, V ⟩ i . This concludes the proof.
Coin-flipping protocol.
Now we describe our coin flipping protocol. ⟨A, B⟩ is a protocol between two parties A and B. Both A and B in the ⟨A, B⟩ protocol get graphs G 1 and G 2 as common input and output a random string of length ℓ ′ (k). We assume that no PPT adversary can output a Hamiltonian cycle in G 1 if B is honest. Similarly, we assume that no PPT adversary can output a Hamiltonian cycle in G 2 if A is honest. Consider the setting in which an instance of the ⟨A, B⟩ protocol is being executed. In this setting we consider an adversary A that adaptively corrupts parties (an honest party reveals its input and random coins to the adversary on corruption) and (assuming dense cryptosystems [DSP92] ) require that:
1. For every adaptive adversary A, there exists a simulator S ⟨A,B⟩ which gets as input a Hamiltonian cycle in G 1 if A is honest (before the start of the protocol), a Hamiltonian cycle in G 2 if B is honest (before the start of the protocol) and a string crs (sampled from the uniform distribution) of length ℓ ′ (k). Furthermore, S ⟨A,B⟩ obtains the input of every party that A corrupts. In this setting we require that the view of the adversary A in its interaction with the honest parties and the view of the adversray A in its interaction with S ⟨A,B⟩ are computationally indistinguishable. 2. The output of the protocol execution is crs as long as either A or B is not corrupted till the end of the protocol.
Our protocol ⟨A, B⟩. (IDCom, IDOpen) is a graph based commitment scheme. And, (G, E, D) is an encryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts and pseudo-random public keys (of length ℓ 1 (k)). Both parties get graphs G 1 and G 2 as common input.
1.
A generates a commitment c = IDCom G1 (α; r 1 ), where α is a random string in {0, 1} ℓ1(k) and r 1 are the random coins. It sends c to B. 
B generates commitments
11. Both parties output γ ⊕ δ as the output of the protocol.
Intuition behind the proof. If B is honest before Step 9, then S ⟨A,B⟩ equivocates in the messages (sent on behalf of B) and thereby forcing the output of the protocol to a value of its choice. Now consider the case in which B is corrupted before Step 9. In this case we need to force the output of the protocol only if A is not corrupted. In this case the simulator S ⟨A,B⟩ will be able to force the value pk generated in Step 3 of the protocol to a value of its choice. Subsequently it can force the output of the protocol to a value of its choice by extracting the values committed by B in Step 7 and then later equivocating in Step 8. Further note that the simulation itself is straight line. However in proving indistinguishability of simulation from real interaction we do rewind the adversary.
12 We provide full details on our simulator for the ⟨A, B⟩ protocols and the proof of the security properties next.
Our Simulator for the coin-flipping protocol
We will now describe our simulator S ⟨A,B⟩ . Note that if A is not corrupted (at the start of the protocol) then the simulator obtains a Hamiltonian cycle w 1 in G 1 and hence it can equivocate on the commitments it sends on A's behalf. Similarly, if B is not corrupted (at the start of the protocol) then the simulator obtains a Hamiltonian cycle w 2 in G 2 and hence it can equivocate on the commitments it sends on B's behalf.
Note that at different points during the execution of the protocol the adversary can corrupt A and/or B. Before every step our simulator checks to see if the party that is supposed to send the next message is already corrupted. If this is indeed the case, then the simulator skips this message. Furthermore, after every message sent by the simulator the adversary can corrupt A and/or B. We describe the actions of the simulator, in case of such a corruption, after every step of the simulator. Further note that without loss of generality we can assume that parties on corruption reveal only those random coins that are not revealed by the transcript itself. We say that there is noting to reveal when the random coins of the party, being corrupted, are revealed by the transcript itself. Finally, besides random coins, on corruption a party must also provide its input to the adversary. Similarly, during simulation our simulator also directly forwards the input of the corrupted party (that is given to the simulator on corruption of the party) to the adversary. The simulation of the inputs of parties can always be done as explained above and therefore we will skip mentioning it.
Our simulator starts by sampling a public-key secret-key pair (pk -A or B is corrupted: Nothing to reveal. 
(Skip if
. From now on our simulator S ⟨A,B⟩ generates messages on behalf of A using the honest A strategy and the values γ and r 2 derived above. Similarly, S ⟨A,B⟩ generates messages on behalf of B using the honest B strategy and the values δ i , s i and t i derived above. If A is honest but B is corrupted:
. From now on our simulator S ⟨A,B⟩ generates messages on behalf of A using the honest A strategy and the values γ and r 2 derived above. If A is corrupted but B is honest: If B is corrupted at this point then set δ
, and set δ := γ ⊕ crs and Proof. Note that (as explained in Section 4) the commitments (as per IDCom G1 or IDCom G2 ) generated by the adversary A (on behalf of A or B) are going to be computationally binding as long as the party to which the commitments are sent is not corrupted. This follows directly from the assumption that no PPT adversary can output a Hamiltonian cycle in G 1 (resp., G 2 ) if B (resp., A) is not corrupted before the start of the protocol. We will use this property throughout our proof. We stress that in our proof we will rewind the adversary at different points but we stress that this is done only to reach a contradiction. Our simulator itself does not need to rely on rewinding. Now, we consider a sequence of hybrids and establish our claim.
-H 0 : This hybrid corresponds to the setting in which the adversary interacts with the simulator S ⟨A,B⟩ that simulates all parties following honest party strategies. This hybrid is the same as the setting of honest parties interacting with the adversary directly. 
Recall that this can be done because S will know a Hamiltonian cycle w 2 in the graph G 2 if it ever sends a commitment on behalf of B because that only happens if B is honest. Also set 
In hybrid H 1,i for every 0 < j ≤ i both e j,δj and e j,1−δj are valid ciphertexts and on the other hand for every i < j ≤ n, e j,δj is a valid ciphertext while e j,1−δj is a random string. Hybrid H 1,0 is same as hybrid H 1 and hybrid H 1,ℓ ′ (k) is same as hybrid H 2 . Now, we will sketch the proof for indistinguishability between hybrids H 1,i−1 and H 1,i . The argument for the rest of the hybrids follows in a similar manner. For the sake of contradiction lets assume that there does exist an adversary A and a distinguisher D such that D can distinguish between the two case. Then, we will construct an adversary C that can break the pseudorandomness property of the encryption scheme. Our adversary externally gets the public key pk ′ as input and needs to force the value pk set in the Step 5 of the protocol to be this value pk ′ . The strategy of B for this will depend of whether A was honest at the time when the message corresponding to Step 1 was sent. If it was honest then C just sets β = α ⊕ pk ′ (Note that S knows the value α). On the other hand, if A is malicious then, our simulator before sending β, starts a look ahead thread (can be repeated multiple times in case of aborts) with A by sending β ′ and thereby obtaining α. It now obtains β = α ⊕ pk ′ and sends β to A on behalf of B in Step 2. Since the commitment scheme IDCom G1 is computationally binding, the adversary A can decommit c to the same α only, thus forcing the value pk generated in the protocol to be pk ′ . Finally, C obtains a challenge ciphertext externally which is either a valid encryption of IDOpen G2 (1 − δ i , s ′ i , w 2 ) or a random string and uses the challenge string as e i,1−δi . This distribution corresponds to hybrid H 1,i−1 if the challenge string is a random string and to hybrid H 1,i in the other case. Hence the ability of the distinguisher to distinguish between H 1,i−1 and H 1,i directly translates to C's ability in distinguishing valid ciphertexts from random strings. -H 3 : Same as the previous hybrid except that our simulator generates commitments c and d differently.
We will describe the change for c only. Our simulator changes generation of d in a similar manner. Our simulator samples α randomly in {0, 1} ℓ1(k) and sets c = IDCom
Recall that this can be done because S will know a Hamiltonian cycle w 1 in the graph G 1 if it ever sends a commitment on behalf of A because that only happens if A is honest. From now on our simulator S generates messages on behalf of A using the honest A strategy and the values α and r 1 derived above. The computational indistinguishability of hybrids H 2 and H 3 follows from the pseudorandomness property of the underlying commitment scheme Com. -H 4 : If A is not corrupted before Step 3 starts, then S needs to send (α, r) on behalf of A. In this case S sets α := pk ′ ⊕ β and r 1 := IDOpen G1 (α, r ′ 1 , w 1 ) and sends (α, r 1 ) to B. Thereby forcing the pk generated in the protocol execution to be pk ′ . The computational indistinguishability of hybrids H 3 and H 4 follows from the pseudorandomness property of the public keys of the public key encryption scheme. Now we will prove indistinguishability by a hybrid argument.
-H 1 : Same as the previous hybrid, except that we use simulator S ⟨P,V ⟩ to interact with the adversary during the trapdoor creation phase. The only difference in hybrids H 0 and H 1 is that S use S ⟨P,V ⟩ instead of following the honest party strategies for the trapdoor creation phase. The indistinguishability of the two hybrids follows from Lemma 1. Before we proceed to the next hybrid we point out the following fact.
• By Lemma 2, if Q j is not corrupted (by the end of the trapdoor creation phase) then A can not output a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph G i,j for any i ∈ [n]{j}, even when it is provided with a Hamiltonian cycle in all other graphs for every i, j ∈ [n] such that i < j and i(n−1)+j < p while it follows honest party strategies in simulation other instances of ⟨A, B⟩ protocol. Observe that the hybrid H 1,0 is the same as hybrid H 1 and hybrid H 1,t is the same as H 2 . We are now now argue that hybrids H 1,p−1 and H 1,p (where 1 < p ≤ n(n − 1)/2) are indistinguishable. The only difference between H 1,p−1 and H 1,p is that one addition instance of ⟨A, B⟩ is simulated in H 1,p using S ⟨A,B⟩ . Observe that all our S can generate all messages the messages sent in all other execution on its own while obtaining the messages for this extra instance for an external party. Next we can argue that the ability of any distinguisher to distinguish between H 1,p−1 can H 1,p can be used directly to contradict Lemma 3. Furthermore from Lemma 3 it also follows that the crs generated in this execution would match the one provided by S.
This concludes the proof.
Realizing all functionalities. Now we elaborate on how we can construct an adaptive secure protocol for any functionality. Recall that we have already constructed a protocol that adaptively securely realizes F n−crs ideal functionality. Therefore we are left with just constructing a protocol secure in the F n−crs -hybrid model. This is implied by the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
Assuming trapdoor permutations and augmented non-committing encryption, for any n ≥ 2, there exists an n-party constant round MPC protocol in the F n−crs -hybrid model that is secure against any malicious adversary which may adaptively corrupt at most n − 1 parties. Remark on the above proposition. Note that if security against corruption of all n parties is desired then a proposition (similar to the one above) that yields a protocol with round complexity that depends on the depth of the circuit being evaluated still holds. Additionally in this setting we can get a constant-round protocol if data erasures are allowed. We refer the reader to Remark 2 in [IPS08] for discussion on this. Proof sketch. The proof of the above proposition is implicit in a number of previous works. For concreteness, we will describe one way of constructing such a protocol. Observe that the F n−crs ideal functionality can be split into n(n−1) 2 ideal functionalities each generating a common random string for each pair of parties (each of these ideal functionalities works correctly as long as at least one of the two parties it is serving is honest). Next note that, using [CLOS02] , given access to a common random string, we can construct an adaptively secure OT protocol. Using this protocol and applying the UC composition theorem [Can00] (Composing Different Setups, Page 61), multiple times, we can construct a protocol that achieves adaptively secure OT 14 between every pair of parties (as long as at least one of the two parties it is serving is honest). Finally, using these OT channels [IPS08] we can adaptively securely realize any functionality. corrupt parties different from the ones that were corrupted in the main thread. In this case the simulator is not able to continue with the look-ahead thread and therefore obtains no additional information via rewindings. However, this can actually be handled by sufficiently increasing the round complexity of the protocol. Consider a protocol with round complexity that is sufficiently larger than the number of parties. For such a protocol, we can argue that there will exist a number of rounds during which the adversary does not corrupt any party. As we next see this solution indeed works. We stress that the main result of this paper is a constant round protocol using non-black box simulation. So we do not give full details of this construction but instead just sketch the construction.
We start by describing a black-box construction for the ⟨P, V ⟩ protocol (see Section 5.1) secure in the setting of n-parties with an adaptive adversary. We will use a simple challenge-response based extractable statistically-binding string commitment scheme that has been used in several prior works, most notably [PRS02, Ros04] . We note that in contrast to [PRS02] we will need a multi-slot protocol where the number of slots actually depend on the number of parties. Let Com(·) denote the commitment function of a noninteractive perfectly binding string commitment scheme (as described in Section 4). Our protocol proceeds as follows.
1. V samples a random string α ∈ {0, 1} 3k , and 2kn independently chosen random pairs {β Now we roughly argue that the protocol above is secure in the adaptive setting. Firstly, we require that the adversary cannot output a Hamiltonian cycle generated in an execution of the above protocol as long as V is not corrupted by the end of the protocol execution. This follows directly from the hiding property of Com. Secondly, we need to show a simulator that can simulate the view of the adaptive adversary and output the Hamiltonian cycle in the graph generated if P is not corrupted till the end of the protocol. Again our simulator for this is very simple. Our simulator follows the honest party protocol on behalf of the uncorrupted parties and forces the output to be a pre-chosen pseudorandom string allowing it to output the cycle in the graph generated. However note that the simulator needs to know α in order to force the output of the protocol to a value of its choice. Simulator can obtain α based on whether V was corrupted when the first message of the protocol was sent. If V was honest then our simulator is already aware of α. On the other hand if V was corrupted then our simulator needs to rely on rewinding to extract α. Observe that we have 2n slots and the adversary can corrupt up to n parties. Therefore there must exist at least n slots where no party is corrupted and our simulator can rewind in these slots with the hope of extracting α. Since the simulator has a number of rewinding opportunities we can argue that the simulator will always (except with negligible probability) be able to extract α before it sends β on behalf of P in the protocol.
We can construct an adaptively secure n-party protocol by executing the above protocol between every pair of parties and following the construction described in Section 6. However, we will need to execute the instances of the ⟨P, V ⟩ protocol described above sequentially. Therefore the round complexity of the protocol will be O(n 3 ). We believe that the round complexity of the protocol can be imporved to O(n) by using non-malleable commitments [DDN91,Goy11,LP11] instead of Com, allowing for parallel executions of the ⟨P, V ⟩ protocol. Note that this round complexity would be almost tight with respect to our impossibility result (Section 3). However, as pointed out earlier, since we have already constructed a constant round protocol we do not delve into optimizing the round complexity of this protocol.
